

Message Text

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00512 01 OF 03 131717Z

44

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AEC-07 CIAE-00 H-02

INR-07 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-02 PM-03

PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-15 TRSE-00

RSC-01 NSC-05 BIB-01 AECE-00 EB-07 /108 W

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P R 131348Z DEC 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0782

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0512

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: DE VOS DECEMBER 12, 1974

PRESS CONFERENCE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0520

SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR DE VOS RESPONDED TO Q'S AND A'S FROM AMONG THE 40 OR MORE NEWSMEN ATTENDING HIS PRESS CONFERENCE. MOST QUESTIONS WERE ON INCLUSION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THESE TALKS. DE VOS REJECTED PRESS CONTENTIONS THAT THERE WAS NO PROGRESS OR A DEADLOCK IN THE VIENNA TALKS, POINT TO COMPLEXITIES OF NEGOTIATIONS AND NEED TO PROCEED CAREFULLY BEFORE MAKING AGREEMENT AFFECTING SECURITY OF ALL. TEXT OF Q'S AND A'S FOLLOWS.

END OF SUMMARY

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00512 01 OF 03 131717Z

BEGIN TEXT OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

DE VOS DECEMBER 12 1974 PRESS CONFERENCE, Q'S AND A'S

1. Q. (GOSHKO, WASHINGTON POST) MR. AMBASSADOR, EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE APPEARING HERE AS A SPOKESMAN FOR ALL OF THE NATO COUNTRIES, I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU A QUESTION IN YOUR CAPACITY AS HEAD OF THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION. THERE HAD BEEN SOME REPORTS, WHICH HAVE BEEN A LITTLE BIT CONFUSING, ABOUT PROPOSALS MADE BY MR. VREDELING IN THE NATO DEFENSE COUNCIL IN BRUSSELS EARLIER THIS WEEK. COULD YOU GIVE US SOME CLARIFICATION ON WHAT THIS MEANS IN TERMS OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS HERE. THIS LEADS TO SOME APPARENT INCLUSION OF THE NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE MBFR TALKS.

A. I WILL BE HAPPY TO MAKE SOME COMMENTS CONCERNING THAT. THE PRESENT NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT MADE CLEAR ALREADY WHEN IT CAME INTO OFFICE 20 MONTHS AGO IN THE PROGRAM IT SUBMITTED TO PARLIAMENT AT THAT TIME THAT IT FAVORED AN EXAMINATION OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF REDUCING THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT ALSO SUBSEQUENTLY MADE KNOWN, AND IT HAS REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED THAT VIEW, BOTH IN PUBLIC AND IN PARLIAMENT, THAT IT WAS IN FAVOR OF EXAMINING THE POSSIBILITY OF BRINGING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THAT IS TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INTO THE PURVIEW OF THE MBFR DISCUSSIONS. HOWEVER, THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT ALSO CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE ALLIED APPROACH TO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. YOU MAY HAVE SEEN THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED YESTERDAY IN BRUSSELS, AFTER THE END OF THE MEETING OF THE NATO DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE, IN WHICH IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT ALL MINISTERS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE ALLIANCE APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. OF COURSE, THIS COMMUNIQUE WAS ALSO SIGNED BY THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS REPRESENTED IN THAT MEETING BY ITS MINISTER OF DEFENSE, WHOSE NAME YOU JUST MENTIONED - MR. VREDELING. SO THIS IS THE SITUATION: WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE ALLIANCE APPROACH.

2. Q. (LENDVAI, FINANCIAL TIMES) THAT IS A BIT OF A TWO-FACED APPROACH. ON THE ONE HAND, THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT SEEMS TO BE UNDERCUTTING THE WESTERN POSITION, ON THE OTHER HAND YOU STATE FORMALLY THAT YOU SUPPORT IT.
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00512 01 OF 03 131717Z

A. OF COURSE, THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT IS FREE TO HAVE ITS OWN OPINION, AND TO EXPRESS THAT OPINION, NOT ONLY IN THE COUNTRY ITSELF, BUT ALSO IN THE ALLIANCE. AND IT HAS MADE ITS VIEWS KNOWN WITHIN THE ALLIANCE REPEATEDLY; THEY ARE WELL KNOWN. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO ADHERED TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT THAT ALLIANCE IS THE MAIN VEHICLE, AS WE SEE IT, FOR THE TIME BEING FOR THE DETENTE POLICY, AND

THIS MEANS THAT THE ALLIANCE, THE ALLIES, HAVE TO WORK TOGETHER. FOR THAT REASON THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE VERY CLEAR, AND WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR, THAT IT WILL CONFORM TO AND SUPPORT THE ALLIANCE POSITION.

3. Q. (MITCHELMORE, NEW YORK TIMES) IN CONTEXT OF THAT, MR. AMBASSADOR, I SEE THAT YOU ARE SAYING IN YOUR STATEMENT THAT "WE ARE UNWILLING TO REDUCE OUR AIRFORCE". BUT I DO NOT FIND SUCH A STRONG STATEMENT WITH REGARDS TO TACTIAL NUCLEAR WEAOONS. IS THAT AN OVERSIGHT?

A. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT OVERALL MANPOWER NOW, AND NOT ABOUT SPECIFIC TYPES OF WEAPONS. IF YOU COVER OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, AS WE HAVE INDICATED WE ARE WILLING AND PREPARED TO DO, AND YOU ALSO COVER OVERALL AIR FORCE MANPOWER, AS WE HAVE NOW INDICATED THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THAT, THAN YOU AUTOMATICALLY COVER ALL FORCES, BECAUSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE EITHER PART OF THE AIR FORCES OR OF THE GROUND FORCES. IMPLICITLY, THEY ARE UNDER SUCH AN OVERALL LIMITATION.

4. Q. (POSSANER, DIE PRESSE) MR. AMBASSADOR, I WOULD LIKE TO GET BACK TO THE QUESTION CONCERNING MR. VREDELING. (DEVOS: I WOULD NOT LIKE TO TURN THIS INTO A NATIONAL PRESS CONFERENCE.) BUT THIS IS ESSENTIAL. IF MR. VREDELING SAYS THAT FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW IT WOULD BE BETTER TO REDUCE TACTICAL NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE, AND YOUR PERSONAL POSITION HERE AS REPRESENTATIVE OF YOUR COUNTRY AND AS THE SPEAKER OF THE NATO CAMP, DOES THIS NOT SHOW DISSENT IN THE NATO CAMP?

A. ONE OF THE GOOD THINGS ABOUT THE NATO COUNCIL IS THAT ONE IS ALWAYS FREE TO DISSENT, AND EVERYBODY IS ENTILED UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00512 01 OF 03 131717Z

TO HIS OWN OPINION. THE NATO COUNCIL IS ALWAYS DISCUSSING THINGS, AND EVERY GOVERNMENT HAS ITS OWN OPINION AND IS ENTITLED TO IT. WHAT MATTERS IS THAT WE TRY TO HARMONIZE THESE OPINIONS WITHIN THE COUNCIL, AND ONCE WE HAVE HARMONIZED THEM AND TAKEN A COMMON POSITION, THEN WE ALL SUPPORT IT. AND THAT IS THE BASIC POSITION OF THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT. (SO THERE IS NO DISSENT HERE IN VIENNA). IT IS NOT AN ISSUE IN VIENNA. WE ARE ONE GROUP, AND WE HAVE A COMMON POSITION WHICH WE ALL SUPPORT. (WELL, YOUR GOVERNMENT SAYS "A" AND YOU SAY "B".) I CAN ONLY REPEAT THAT THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT IS SUPPORTING THE ALLIANCE APPROACH TO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00512 02 OF 03 131822Z

44

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P R 131348Z DEC 74

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AMEMBASSY BONN

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UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0512

FROM US REP MBFR

5. Q. (UNIDENTIFIED) MAY I TAKE THE HEAT OFF THE NETHERLANDS?
IN RECENT WEEKS THERE HAS BEEN CERTAIN AMOUNT OF AGGRESSIVE
TALK FROM THE U.S. TO THE OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES. THERE
HAVE ALSO BEEN, MUCH MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, NAVAL OPERATIONS
IN THE INDIANOCEAN, WITH THE U.S. PARTICIPATING. DOES NOT
THAT SUGGEST THAT THE CENTER OF ARMED FORCES PRESSURE MAY
BE MOVING FROM EUROPE TO THE SOUTHRN PART OF ASIA?

A. THIS IS A VERY INTERESTING, AS WELL AS A WIDE-RANGING
QUESTION, AND A LITTLE BIT OUTSIDE THE AREA OF THE NEG-
OTIATIONS WE ARE CONDUCTING HERE. I WOULD NOT LIKE TO
SPECULATE TOO MUCH ON THAT. I THINK WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON
THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION WHICH STILL IS A FACT IN EUROPE,
IF YOU LOOK AT THE NUMBER OF FORCES WHICH ARE ONBOTH
SIDES. IT IS OUR TASK HERE TO TRY TO FIND THE FORMULAS
WITH WHICH WE CAN REDUCE THAT CONFRONTATION. AND IF WE
UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00512 02 OF 03 131822Z

SUCCEED IN THAT, WE CAN BE QUITE SATISFIED.

6. Q. (WIELAND, REUTERS). MR. AMBASSADOR, I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU A QUESTION ABOUT YOUR DECISION TO EXTEND THE FREEZE AFTER THE FIRST STAGE TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE PERSONNEL. YOU DESCRIBE THAT AS AN IMPORTANT STEP. I WONDER WHETHER YOU CAN TELL US TO WHAT EXTENT THAT MAY ANSWER THE CONCERNS OF THE EASTERN SIDE. HAS THIS BEEN A SERIOUS ISSUE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS?

A. IT HAS INDEED BEEN A CONCERN EXPRESSED BY THE EASTERN SIDE. BUT OUR APPROACH, WHICH FOCUSED ON REMOVING THE DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES OF BOTH SIDES, THESE LARGE DISPARITIES WHICH WE FEEL ARE A KEY ELEMENT IN THE SECURITY SITUATION, THIS LARGE AND POTENTIALLY DESABILIZING FACTOR, BY NEGLECTING OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE FORCES - ESPECIALLY AIR FORCES - WE WOULD POSSIBLY OPEN THE WAY TO CIRCUMVENT AN AGREEMENT. FOR INSTANCE, WE COULD CIRCUMVENT AN AGREEMENT BY INCREASING THE AIR FORCES. WE HAVE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THAT ARGUMENT, AND SINCE WE FOUND THAT THIS WAS A SERIOUS EASTERN CONCERN, AND A VALID ONE, WE HAVE INDICATED A WAY OF MEETING THAT CONCERN. I THINK WE HAVE MADE A CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL, AND WE HOPE THAT THE OTHER SIDE WILL RECOGNIZE OUR CONSTRUCTIVE AIM AND ITS SERIOUSNESS, AS WELL AS THE USEFULNESS OF THIS PROPOSAL. (BUT IT DOES NOT FOLLOW FROM THIS THAT YOU HAVE GIVEN ANY INDICATION THAT IN A SUBSEQUENT STAGE YOU WOULD BE PREPARED TO REDUCE THOSE AIR FORCES.) NO; AS I SAID IN MY STATEMENT, WE REMAIN UNWILLING TO REDUCE THE AIR FORCES FOR REASONS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY GIVEN, MILITARY REASONS, AND AS I ALSO SAID, THE LARGE DISPARITIES ARE NOT IN THE AIR FORCES - THEY ARE IN THE GROUND FORCES. HERE IS WHERE WE HAVE TO LOOK FOR MEANS AND WAYS TO DECREASE INSTABILITY IN THE SECTOR OF THE GROUND FORCES. THESE ENORMOUS DISPARITIES ARE POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING FACTORS IN OUR VIEW. THAT IS WHY WE WANT TO GIVE PRIORITY TO SOLVING THIS PROBLEM.

7. Q. (POSSANER, PRESSE) MR. AMBASSADOR, WE LEARNED FROM THE NATO MEETING THAT THE WESTERN SIDE HAS REINFORCED ITS TROOPS BY 1600 TANKS. NOW THE TANK DISPARITY BETWEEN EAST
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00512 02 OF 03 131822Z

AND WEST WOULD NO LONGER BE 9,500, BUT THIS NUMBER MINUS 1600. HAS THIS FIGURE OF 1600 BEEN ARGREED UPON DURING THIS MEETING, OR, IF NOT, DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA HOW THE EASTERN

SIDE WILL REACT TO THIS REINFORCEMENT?

A. IF I AM CORRECT, THE 1600 FIGURE DOES NOT PERTAIN EXCLUSIVELY TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THIS IS A NATO-WIDE, A EUROPE-WIDE FIGURE. IT IS NOT REALLY AN EXPANSION OF FORCES, BUT PERTAINS TO MODERIZATION OF FORCES. INASFAH AS IT INCLUDES A POSSIBLE EXTENSION AS WELL, WELL, THIS WOULD BE ONE WAY OF MAKING UP DISPARITIES - BUT NOT THE BEST ONE. WE ARE HERE TO WORK ON REDUCTIONS. OF COURSE, WE HAVE NO AGREEMENT AS YET. THAT IS ONE REASON WHY WE SHOULD MAKE ALL EFFORTS TO CONTINUE OUR NEGOTIATIONS HERE.

8. Q (ERTL, KURIER) MR. AMBASSADOR, YOU HAVE TALKED ABOUT A MUTUAL AGREEMENT NOT TO INCREASE THE OVERALL LEVEL OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES, AND YOU HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED THE LEVEL OF OVERALL AIR FORCE MANPOWER. DOES THIS INDICATE THAT YOU PUT YOUR MAIN EFFORTS INTO NOT INCREASING, RATHER THAN REDUCING FORCES?

A. WE HAVE MADE THESE SUGGESTIONS TO NOT INCREASE OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND NOT TO INCREASE THE OVERALL STRENGTH OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF CERTAIN CONCERNS ON THE OTHER SIDE, WHICH I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED. THESE MEASURES ARE NOT MEANT TO BE CONSIDERED IN ISOLATION. THEY ARE TO SUPPLEMENT OUR BASIC NEGOTIATING POSITION WHICH IS AIMED AT SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCING THE FORCES ON BOTH SIDES, AND AT THE SAME TIME TO DEAL WITH MAJOR DISPARITIES EXISTING IN THE GROUND FORCE RELATIONS. THESE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENTS WHICH WE PROPOSE ARE NOT TO BE PUT IN PLACE OF REDUCTIONS, BUT ARE TO SUPPLEMENT THE REDUCTION PROPOSALS WE MADE AND TO FACILITATE THE ACCEPTANCE BY BOTH SIDES OF THESE PROPOSALS.

9. Q. (MITCHELMORE, NYT) IT SEEMS FROM THE LANGUAGE OF YOUR STATEMENT THAT BOTH OF THESE FREEZES OFFERED, ON GROUND FORCES AND ON AIR FORCES, WERE REJECTED BY THE UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00512 02 OF 03 131822Z

EASTERN SIDE?

A. I WOULD NOT SAY THAT THEY HAD BEEN REJECTED. WE HOPE THAT THEY HAVE NOT REJECTED THEM. WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS TO THESE SUGGESTIONS, BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD IN GOOD FAITH AND THEY ARE DESIGNED TO MEET THE CONCERNS THAT THE OTHER SIDE HAS EXPRESSED, AND WHICH WE CONSIDER VALID. SO I HOPE THAT AFTER FURTHER STUDYING AND ANALYZING THEM, THEY WILL COME TO RECOGNIZE THAT WE HAVE MADE INDEED A GOOD AND CONSTRUCTIVE MOVE.

10. Q. (ERTL, KURIER) BUT DOES THIS NOT INCREASING THE OVERALL LEVEL MEAN THAT YOU PRECLUDE YOURSELF FROM NOT CHANGING THE GENERAL FORCES INTO SPECIAL BALLISTIC FORCES, AS WAS ANNOUNCED TO BE TAKING PLACE IN WESTERN GERMANY?

A. THE U.S. TROOP RESTRUCTURING, IF I MAY SAY SO, IS NOT AN EXPANSION OF U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE, IT IS CHANGE, IT MEANS, IT MEANS REPLACEMENT OF LOGISTIC TROOPS WITH COMBAT TROOPS. I THINK THE FIGURE IS 18,000, TO TAKE PLACE OVER A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS. THIS IS BASED ON CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION. BUT THIS IS NOT AN EXPANSION OF FORCES. SO THIS WILL NOT BE IN CONFLICT WITH WHAT WE HAVE PROPOSED IN THE AREA OF A NON-INCREASE OF OVERALL STRENGTH. (BUT IN EFFECT IT WOULD STRENGTHEN YOUR FORCES.) IT WOULD BE A STREAMLINING. IT WOULD BE GETTING THE MOST VALUE OUT OF YOUR FORCES. ALL NATIONS ARE TRYING TO GET THE BEST POSSIBLE PRODUCT OUT OF THE HIGH EXPENDITURES THAT THEY HAVE TO DEVOTE TO DEFENSE. AND IN VIEW OF THE INCREASING COSTS OF DEFENSE, AND THE INCREASING COSTS OF MANPOWER, IT IS ONLY NATURAL TO TRY TO STREAMLINE ONE'S FORCES. IT IS NOT AN EXTENSION OF THE FORCES.

UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00512 03 OF 03 131829Z

44

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-07 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

BIB-01 ACDE-00 AECE-00 EB-07 /108 W

----- 056473

P R 131348Z DEC 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0784

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

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UNCLAS SECTION 3 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0512

FROM US REP MBFR

11. 1. (GDR NEW AGENCY). MR. AMBASSADOR, A GENERAL QUESTION, THERE IS SOME TALK THAT THERE IS A TOTAL DEADLOCK IN VIENNA, OR AS YESTERDAY'S FAZ SPOKE ABOUT IT, "THINGS ARE COMPLETELY BLOCKED". DO YOU SHARE THIS VIEW?

A. NO. THERE CERTAINLY IS NO DEADLOCK AS FAR AS WE CAN SEE. AS I SAID, WE REMAIN OPTIMISTIC. I SAID THAT IN MY STATEMENT. AND I AM HAPPY TO REPEAT THAT. WE FEEL THAT THERE HAS BEEN QUITE SOME ACTIVITY. I MENTIONED SOME OF THE THINGS WE HAVE PUT FORWARD. THE OTHER SIDE HAS DEVELOPED IDEAS. AND ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT FULLY APPRECIATED THESE IDEAS, AND DIGESTED THEM, THE FACT THAT THERE IS SO MUCH ACTIVITY - AND I INDICATED THAT IN MY STATEMENT - INDICATES THAT THERE IS REASON TO HOPE THAT WE ARE MOVING INTO A MORE ACTIVE NEGOTIATING PHASE AND THAT WE CAN INDEED MAKE PROGRESS IN THE NEXT YEAR.
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00512 03 OF 03 131829Z

12. Q. (NORWEGIAN RADIO) YESTERDAY OR THE DAY BEFORE, THE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. WANT HIGHER MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THEIR EUROPEAN ALLIES. I SUPPOSE WE CAN'T AFFORD THESE HIGHER CONTRIBUTIONS ANYWAY, BUT LET US SAY THAT IF FOR INSTANCE WESTERN GERMANY TOOK UP SUCH A PROPOSAL, WOULD THAT NOT MAKE THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS MORE DIFFICULT?

A. I DO NOT SEE THAT. THE QUESTION OF BURDENSARING IS AN ETERNAL ONE. IT HAS BEEN WITH THE ALLIANCE FROM ITS BEGINNING. THE SUCCESS OF THESE BURDEN-SHARING EFFORTS HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN VERY SPECTACULAR. THERE HAS BEEN A CERTAIN SHIFT OF THE DEFENSE EFFORT, A RELATIVE SHIFT FROM THE U.S. TO EUROPE, IN THE LAST DECADE. THERE MAY BE SOME MORE SHIFTS IN THE FUTURE. THAT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT, FOR ALL THIS DEPENDS ON THE RELATIVE INCREASE IN THE WEALTH ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. GENERALLY, BURDENSARING MEANS SHIFTING WITHIN A CERTAIN TOTAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT. IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THERE HAS TO BE AN INCREASE. IF THERE SHOULD AT SOME TIME BE FEWER AMERICAN FORCES, AND I AM NOT MAKING ANY FORECASTS, THIS IS IN ANY CASE NOT THE CASE OF THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS IN BRUSSELS. DISCUSSING THIS IN A THEORETICAL OR PHILOSOPHICAL WAY, IT MAY IN FUTURE ENTAIL REPLACEMENT OF CERTAIN AMERICAN FORCES BY EUROPEAN FORCES, LEAVING ASIDE THE MBFR EFFORTS. BUT COMING BACK TO MBFR, ONCE WE HAVE ESTABLISHED A

COMMON CEILING ON BOTH SIDES, AND THAT IS WHAT WE ARE STRIVING FOR, WE ON OUR PART WOULD CERTAINLY NOT WANT TO CHANGE THIS SUBSEQUENTLY. WE WOULD CERTAINLY BE VERY CAREFUL THAT ANY BURDENSARING EXERCISE AND CHANGES OF FORCES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WOULD NOT MEAN GOING BEYOND THE COMMON CEILING.

13. Q. (UNIDENTIFIED) MR. AMBASSADOR, FROM THE VLADIVOSTOK MEETING AND PARTLY FROM MR. CHLESINGER'S STATEMENTS, WE LEARNED THAT THERE IS EVIDENTLY SOME AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION TO INCLUDE THE TACTICAL ATOMIC FORCES IN EUROPE IN THE MBFR TALKS HERE. NOW I SEE THAT THE WESTERN STATEMENT DOES NOT EVEN TOUCH THIS QUESTION, AND THE EASTERN STATEMENT TOUCHES IT ONLY SLIGHTLY. WHY THIS HESITATION?

A. THERE IS NO HESITATION. BOTH THE EASTERN AND THE WESTERN
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00512 03 OF 03 131829Z

SIDE RECOGNIZE THAT MEETINGS LIKE THE ONE IN VLADIVOSTOK, WHICH SEEM TO BE SUCCESSFUL, AND SUCCESS IN SALT - THIS CAN ONLY HAVE A BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON OTHER EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS. SO IN THIS RESPECT I SUSPECT THERE IS A CERTAIN MUTUAL INFLUENCE. AS CONCERNS THE FIRST PART OF YOUR QUESTION, IT WAS SPECIFICALLY SAID BY THE U.S., AND ONLY RECENTLY SECRETARY SCHLESINGER REPEATED THIS, THAT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT IN VLADIVOSTOK ON INCLUDING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THERE WAS AGREEMENT NOT TO INCLUDE FBS' IN SALT. BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THEY WOULD AUTOMATICALLY BE INCLUDED IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

14. Q. (LENDVAI, FINANCIAL TIMES) BOTH YOU AND YOUR EAST EUROPEAN COLLEAGUE AGREES THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO PROGRESS SO FAR. IF THERE IS NO PROGRESS, YOU USUALLY CALL THIS A DEADLOCK. AND THE SECOND QUESTION IS: WHERE WILL THESE FBS' THEN BE DISCUSSED? IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WILL BE DISCUSSED IN CISE.

A. AS TO THE FIRST QUESTION, I DO NOT SEE WHY, IF THERE IS NO PROGRESS, THERE MUST BE A DEADLOCK. THERE CAN BE OTHER REASONS FOR NOT MAKING PROGRESS. IT IS JUST THAT WE ARE WORKING WITH A VERY COMPLICATED SUBJECT, AND IT HAS BEEN SUFFICIENTLY EXPLAINED AT PREVIOUS OCCASIONS THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE COMPLEX BECAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF THE PARTICIPANTS - 19 - THE SUBJECT MATTER IS COMPLEX, THE FACT THAT WE DEAL WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES AND THUS WE WOULD NOT LIGHHEARTEDLY TAKE DECISIONS. WE ALWAYS KNEW THAT WE WOULD NEED A LOT OF PATIENCE, A LOT OF PERSERVERANCE, AND THAT IT WILL NOT BE EASY TO REACH SOLUTIONS. WE STILL FEEL THAT WE CERTAINLY ARE NOT DEADLOCKED, AND WE CONTINUE TO HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF HOPE THAT WE CAN MAKE ACTUAL AND FACTUAL PROGRESS IN THE NEXT YEAR. THE QUESTION ABOUT THE FBS' IS A GOOD ONE. WHERE WOULD THEY BE DISCUSSED? THIS IS A VERY COMPLICATED SUBJECT MATTER. THESE SO-CALLED FBS' ARE NOT ONLY

ON THE WESTERN SIDE; THEY ARE ALSO ON THE EASTERN SIDE. AND THEY ARE STATIONED IN AN AREA THAT GOES BEYOND THE ONE WE ARE DISCUSSING HERE. THIS IS JUST TO INDICATE ONE OF THE COMPLICATIONS WHICH ARISE ON THIS ISSUE. AT THIS STAGE I CANNOT GIVE YOU AN ANSWER HOW THEY WOULD BE DISCUSSED. THE ONLY THING I CAN ASSURE YOU IS THAT THE ALLIANCE POSITION HERE CONTINUES TO BE THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES.

UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00512 03 OF 03 131829Z

15. Q. (ERTL, KURIER) MAY WE TAKE IT FROM YOUR STATEMENT THAT YOU EXPECT A FIRST AGREEMENT IN 1975?

A. I DID NOT SAY THAT I EXPECT ANYTHING. I SAID THAT I HAD HOPE. I WOULD HATE TO TRY TO FORECAST ANY SPECIFIC DATES BY WHICH WE COULD REACH AGREEMENT. I SHOULD SAY THAT I SEE NO REASON WHY IT SHOULD BE EXCLUDED THAT WE COULD REACH AN AGREEMENT IN 1975. BUT WOULD NOT LIKE TO FORECAST IT, AND I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS AGAIN THAT THESE ARE VERY COMPLEX DISCUSSIONS, AND WE ARE NOT NEGOTIATING AGAINST A DEADLINE. I CERTAINLY FEEL THAT WE SHOULD AVOID HASTILY AND CARELESSLY DRAFTED AGREEMENTS WHICH THEN MIGHT PROVE TO BE UNSATISFACTORY AND HAMPER RATHER THAN PROMOTE SECURITY OF ALL CONCERNED.

16. Q. (POSSANER, PRESSE) MR. AMBASSADOR, I REALLY DO NOT WANT KEEP AFTER YOU, BUT WHEN YOU SPOKE ABOUT FBS' IN EUROPE, YOU MENTIONED THAT THERE WAS NO STATEMENT BY SECRETARY SCHLESINGER CONCERNING THAT THIS ISSUE WOULD BE TALKED ABOUT IN MBFR. HE DID SAY IT, BUT ONLY IN A CONDITIONAL FORM. HE SAID, IF THERE WERE NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THESE TACTICAL WEAPONS, THEY WOULD BE NEGOTIATED WITHIN MBFR. NOW IF YOU EXCLUDE THIS POSSIBILITY, DO YOU EXPECT THAT WE WILL BE FACING A THIRD CONFERENCE, AFTER MBFR AND SALT?

A. I DO NOT EXPECT ANYTHING, AND I DO NOT FORECAST ANYTHING. I WANT TO SAY THAT SECRETARY SCHLESINGER SAID IN SO MANY WORDS THAT IF THESE SYSTEMS WOULD BE DISCUSSED, MBFR WOULD BE THE FORUM. BUT AT THE SAME TIME HE ALSO SAID THAT THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THEY ACTUALLY WILL BE TAKEN UP IN MBFR. AND THAT IS INDEED THE POSITION. I NOW REPEAT FOR THE THIRD OR FOURTH TIME THAT WE CONTINUE TO HAVE THE POSITION THAT WE SHOULD FOCUS OUR NEGOTIATIONS HERE ON REMOVAL OF THE LARGE DISPARITIES IN CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES. DISPARITIES WHICH ONLY FAVOR THE EASTERN SIDE.

17. Q. (CLARK, BBC) MR. AMBASSADOR, YOU SAID IN YOUR STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT OF PHASING THAT COMMITMENTS HAD BEEN OFFERED TO THE EAST THAT THE SECOND PHASE REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN A FIXED REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME. IN VIEW OF THAT, COULD YOU COMMENT ON THE STATEMENT MADE EARLIER BY THE WARSAW PACT SPOKESMAN, WHO COMPLAINED ABOUT POSTPONING OF

REDUCTIONS BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FOR SEVERAL YEARS. HE
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 MBFR V 00512 03 OF 03 131829Z

SAID THAT AFTER A FIRST SOVIET-U.S. FIRST PHASE, THE OTHER
PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT REDUCE FOR SEVERAL YEARS. IS HE JUSTIFIED
IN SUGGESTING THAT SEVERAL YEARS WILL INDEED PASS, AND WOULD
YOU CALL THAT A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME?

A. I DON'T THINK ONE CAN STATE IT THAT WAY, THAT WE HAVE
POSTPONED THEM FOR SEVERAL YEARS. IT IS QUITE IN CONFORMITY WITH
THE INDICATINS WE HAVE GIVEN TO THE OTHER SIDE. I DO NOT WANT
TO GO INTO DETAILS HERE. WE TRY TO ADHERE AS MUCH AS
POSSIBLE TO THE RULE OF CONFIDENTIALITY. I READ THIS COMMENT ABOUT
THE SEVERAL YEARS JUST A SHORT TIME AGO, AND I COULDN'T
QUITE UNDERSTAND WHAT IT WAS BASED ON. END TEXT. RESOR

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: COLLECTIVE SECURITY, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, PRESS CONFERENCES, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TEXTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 DEC 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MBFRV00512
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: N/A
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From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
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Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 74 MBFR VIENNA 0520
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: MorefiRH
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 04 OCT 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <04 OCT 2002 by ReddocGW>; APPROVED <16 JAN 2003 by MorefiRH>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: DE VOS DECEMBER 12, 1974 PRESS CONFERENCE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
TAGS: PARM, NATO, (DE VOS)
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005